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ABSTRACT 
In recent years critical scholars have emphasised how the recollection of past events as 
traumas can both constrain and widen the political possibilities of a present. This 
article builds on such research by suggesting that the management of contemporary 
financial crises is reliant on a ritual work of repetition, wherein prior ‘crisis’ episodes 
are called upon to identify and authorise specific sites and modes of crisis 
management. In order to develop this argument, I focus on how past crises figure 
within the public pronouncements of four key policymaking organisations during the 
financial instability of 2007-2009. I find that while the Great Depression does enable 
these organisations to reaffirm old ways of managing crises, both it and the more 
recent Asian crisis are also made to disclose new truths about the evolution of 
multilateralism as a form of governance. In so doing, I argue, these historical 
narratives reveal how the management of global financial crisis depends upon a kind 
of ‘magic trick’. Rather than a strictly rational, historical process of problem solving, 
contemporary crises are instead negotiated through a contingent and self-referential 
conjuring of crisis-histories. 
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A scramble to the past  
 
 
We are all, together, writing the history of crisis management as we speak. 
 
Jean-Claude Trichet1 
 
 
It was on Tuesday the 7th of October 2008, at the inaugural World Policy Conference 
in Evian, that Jean-Claude Trichet issued these words to an audience of finance 
ministers, heads of state, policy experts, and senior officials from international 
organisations. Only a day before, Angela Merkel had announced the rescue of one of 
Germany’s biggest banks, and a mere day later, Gordon Brown would announce his 
plan for the recapitalisation of British and UK-based financial institutions. Trichet 
therefore spoke amidst a frantic search for policy solutions, and his words underscore 
the novelty of these efforts at crisis management. However, in his commentary on 
such initiatives, Trichet – along with his opposite numbers at various other 
organisations – found recourse to a range of prior crisis episodes. 
Rather than ask what is at stake in such a scramble to the past, realist and 
liberal scholars have tended to instead write their own crisis-histories through similar 
means. Thomas Oatley, for example, has characterised the collapse of 2008 as the 
latest in a series of global crises generated by the expansion of American military and 
financial power.2 In contrast, Daniel Drezner has used a counter-analogy between 
2008 and the 1930s to highlight the success of international organisations in 
preventing the world from sliding into another Great Depression.3 These opposing 
views form part of a broader trend within political economy thinking on crisis, which 
is to oscillate between optimism and pessimism about the likely recurrence of prior 
crises.4 But if figures such as Trichet underscore the novelty of the present at the same 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 President of the European Central Bank (2003–2011) quoted in Quentin Peel, ‘Europe 
writes a history of crisis management’, The Financial Times, 9 October 2008. 
2 Thomas Oatley, A Political Economy of American Hegemony: Buildups, Booms, and Busts 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
3 Daniel Drezner, The System Worked: How the World Stopped Another Great Depression (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014). 
4 See Hyman P. Minsky, Can ‘It’ Happen Again? Essays on Instability and Finance (New York, NY: 
M.E. Sharpe, 1982); J. Bradford Delong, ‘Financial Crises in the 1890s and the 1990s: Must 
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time as they call upon the familiarities of the past, then their appeal to history must 
amount to more than the simple threat that it might repeat itself.  
In this article I argue that statements such as Trichet’s provide a window onto 
the scrambled nature of historical time and the strange loops through which our 
efforts to govern or manage it take shape. More specifically, I suggest that the 
diagnosis and management of contemporary financial crisis hinges on the recollection 
of prior crisis episodes, whose imputed affiliations enable the present to assume a place 
within both cyclical and linear narratives of historical development. In so doing I draw 
on the recent turn to trauma theory within international studies. This new literature 
has made great strides in demonstrating how an awareness or presence of the past can 
give shape to contemporary understandings of blame, victimhood, contingency, and 
necessity in world politics.5 Here I seek to further develop the specifically historical 
dimensions of trauma by positing history itself as both wound and salve under 
contemporary global capitalism. The return of or to past crises, I argue, provides a 
ritual defense against what Mircea Eliade once called the “terror of history”.6 
In the same way that the peoples of ancient religious societies would 
periodically return to mythical events in order to generate or reaffirm their place in 
the cosmos, the managers of global finance have returned to the ‘crises’ of recent 
financial history, using these to invest an otherwise senseless present with meaning. 
But rather than a revolt against the chaos of historical time, this ritual repetition of 
past crises instead provides a means of developing new ways to manage or govern it. I 
develop this argument through an analysis of elites’ appeals to the Great Depression 
and the Asian crisis during the 2007-2009 period. In these appeals I uncover evidence 
of history being used not simply to reiterate familiar diagnoses and treatments for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
History Repeat?’ Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:(1999), pp. 253-94; Carmen M. 
Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
5 Duncan Bell provides an invaluable overview of this literature in his edited collection, 
Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship Between Past and Present 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). See also Jenny Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of 
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Maja Zehfuss, Wounds of Memory: 
The Politics of War in Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). In relation to 
global finance and financial crisis in particular see James Brassett and Chris Clarke, 
‘Performing the Sub-Prime Crisis: Trauma and the Financial Event’, International Political 
Sociology, 6:1 (2012), pp. 4-20, and James Brassett and Nick Vaughan-Williams, ‘Crisis is 
Governance: Sub-prime, the Traumatic Event, and Bare Life’, Global Society, 26:1 (2012), pp. 
19-42. 
6 Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return: Or, Cosmos and History, trans. Willard Trask 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991/1954), p. 149. 
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financial crisis, but also to identify and authorise new sites and modes of crisis 
management. This latter process amounts to a form of ‘historiophany’, wherein the 
narrative operation enables agents to retroactively perceive past crises in ways that 
reveal new apparent truths about the shape of political and economic history.7 In this 
instance, I argue that such revelatory narratives work to reconfigure the relation 
between prior episodes of crisis management and the emergence or on-going 
evolution of the multilateral spirit. By delivering both past and present over to this 
spirit, these narratives provide global projects of crisis management with a practical 
anchor. At the same time, though, they also reveal how such projects have themselves 
come to depend on a kind of ‘magic trick’. Simply put, while efforts at crisis 
management appear to have the truth of history on their side, this truth can only ever 
emerge through a contingent and self-referential conjuring of crisis-histories. 
I develop this argument over four sections. In the first I provide a brief 
theoretical discussion of the relation between history, crisis, memory, and trauma. I 
then use Eliade’s ideas about repetition and return to underline the therapeutic 
functions of repeatedly returning to past crises. With these functions in mind, I 
undertake an empirical analysis of how the Great Depression and the Asian crisis have 
formed the basis for narratives about the birth and evolution of multilateralism, 
focusing on elite discourse during the 2007-2009 period. Finally, I conclude by 
offering some brief reflections on the critical potential of continuing to speak about 
contemporary global finance in terms of crisis. 
 
History, crisis, memory, trauma 
 
Modern crisis theory is concerned with identifying the critical junctures or turning 
points that punctuate human history. This reflects the etymology of crisis, whose 
meaning in Ancient Greek carries through into various strands of social, political, and 
economic thought.8 Yet in order for ‘crisis’ to name a decisive turning point, history 
must be given a particular shape or figure; that is, both its logic and patterns of 
development must assume a determinate form. Take Marx’s concept of epochal crisis, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 ‘Historiophany’ is a neologism intended to specify an epiphany brought on through the 
apparent manifestation of History to humankind. It is a play on ‘theophany’, where of course 
it is God that appears. 
8 See Reinhart Koselleck, ‘Crisis’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 67:2 (2006), pp. 357-400, 
especially at 358-61 and 368-97. 
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which denotes a point of transition between different modes of production.9 This 
concept only makes sense if one first pits productive forces against relations of 
production, and then divides history into a succession of phases or stages. The same 
goes for other modern theories of crisis, which are equally dependent on specific 
renderings of historical process and change. This is my first key point: the concept of 
‘crisis’ relies on an idea of ‘history’.   
But at the same time, the concept of crisis is also a means of giving shape and 
figure to history. That is, history itself can be understood as an idea whose contours 
emerge through deployments of the crisis concept. Here the thought of Hayden White 
is instructive. For White, who follows Schiller and Nietzsche, ‘history’ is the sublime 
and formless chaos of pure occurrence. 10  Events always proliferate, but they 
themselves never possess any specific meaning in relation to one another. 
Consequently, it is only by someone imposing a story-order on them that events can 
ever appear as part of a developmental process. White terms such an imposition a 
‘narrativisation’, and drawing on Louis Mink, he disaggregates this operation into a 
selection, sequencing, and configuration of past events.11 But if history only attains 
order through narrativisation, then the concept of crisis – which provides so many 
stories about the pressure for a different future – is also a means of investing history 
with meaning. This is my second key point: ‘history’ and ‘crisis’ are entwined through 
their reliance on the narrative form. 
The content of this narrative form is its figurative referent: ‘crisis/history’. 
However, this figurative referent cannot produce or reveal itself; something must be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Marx’s writings on crisis are notoriously fragmented, spawning an entire cottage industry 
in critical exegesis. My comments here relate to his discussion of over-accumulation in Capital: 
Volume III (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977/1894), pp. 247-59. For more on the role of 
‘crisis’ in Marxian economics see Paul Mattick, Economic Crisis and Crisis Theory (London: 
Merlin Press, 1981), pp. 43-77. 
10 On history and the sublime see White’s 1982 article, ‘The Politics of Historical 
Interpretation: Discipline and De-Sublimation’, reprinted in The Content of the Form: Narrative 
Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), pp. 58-
82, at 69ff. See also Nietzsche’s ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’, in Daniel 
Breazeale (ed.), Friedrich Nietzsche: Untimely Meditations (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997/1874), pp. 57-124. 
11 White, Content of the Form, pp. 23-5, 44-6, and 66-8; cf. Louis O. Mink, ‘Narrative Form as 
Cognitive Instrument’, in Robert Canary and Henry Kozicki (ed.), The Writing of History: 
Literary Form and Historical Understanding (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), pp. 
129-49, especially at 143-44. Paul Ricoeur also appropriates and builds on Mink’s concept of 
configuration. For example, see his essay on ‘The Narrative Function’, in John Thompson 
(ed.), Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 274-96. 
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narrativised, and someone must do the narrativising. More specifically, a series of past 
events must be recalled before they can be narrativised, and this can only ever occur 
through institutions that are specific to a present conjuncture. Enter ‘memory’. As a 
relatively new “counter-concept” to history, memory has produced a remarkable 
boom in scholarly work.12 In his final book, entitled Memory, History, Forgetting, Paul 
Ricoeur issues two important reminders regarding the ‘history/memory’ nexus. The 
first is that there are both cognitive and pragmatic dimensions to memory.13 The 
former consists in a capacity to recall, whereas the latter entails an active searching 
and finding – a mnemonic operation that elevates memory beyond pure recall. His 
second point is that anything beyond individual memory – such as social, cultural, or 
collective memory – cannot be understood without reference to the conventions and 
practices of historians.14 It is through such conventions and practices that a repertoire 
of ‘historical’ events is produced, and it is precisely these kinds of events that must be 
recalled and narrativised in order to transform pure occurrence into either history or 
crisis. Taken together these form my third key point: conjuring ‘crisis/history’ entails 
sifting through a past that is produced and preserved by historiography. 
From this it follows that naming crises and giving shape to history are neither 
objective nor politically neutral processes. To announce a ‘crisis’, one must remember 
or recall past events; for this crisis to be properly ‘historical’, one must route their 
recollections through those events already enshrined in the historical record; and to do 
this, one must submit – if not entirely then at least in part – to the writing practices 
that enabled prior events to be recorded as historical in the first place. This, according 
to Michel de Certeau, is how the machinery of historical discourse “produces a sense 
of reliability”.15 Yet because agents occupy different positions in relation to this 
machinery, the power to make ‘crisis/history’ is not evenly distributed. There are 
history-makers and there are history-takers. This is my fourth key point: the crises of 
‘history’, its histories of ‘crisis’, and the pragmatics of ‘memory’ are all implicated in 
the reproduction of contemporary social relations. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Kerwin Lee Klein, ‘On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse’, Representations, 
69: Winter (2000), pp. 127-50, at 128. With ‘counter-concept’ Klein means to highlight the 
ability of ‘memory’ to reorient the focus and conduct of historical studies. For Klein and 
others there are signs not only that this reorientation has taken place, but also that a reversal 
may be underway. See Gavriel Rosenfeld, ‘A Looming Crash or a Soft Landing? Forecasting 
the Future of the Memory Industry’, The Journal of Modern History, 81:1 (2009), pp. 122-58. 
13 Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, pp. 5-55. 
14 Ibid., pp. 56-92 and 234-92. 
15 de Certeau, Writing of History, p. 94. 
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Since 2008 this nexus has emerged as point of focus for critical studies of 
global finance. In particular, James Brassett has written a number of articles that 
explore the role that discourses of trauma and crisis might perform during times of 
financial instability. I will take up the question of trauma in the next section. The 
point I wish to make here is that Brassett’s concern with trauma and crisis opens out 
onto issues relating to the politics of historical memory. For example, in a recent 
article with Christopher Clarke, he argues that the financial instability of 2008 was 
both given meaning and governed through a discourse of trauma.16 The two authors 
use a range of empirical materials to substantiate this claim, but one of their points is 
that appeals to the horror of the Great Depression – along with suggestions that a 
similar event might recur – exercised a disciplining force over the present. By serving 
as “the historical mirror point for the sub-prime crisis”, they argue, the Great 
Depression worked to radically curtail the ways in which that later present was 
experienced and responded to.17 On this view, trauma discourse works to relay ‘crisis’ 
events as extrinsic, as natural, and above all, as demanding the same kind of 
therapeutic response that they did the last time. 
Brassett develops this line of argument in another article on the so-called sub-
prime crisis, this time written with Nick Vaughan-Williams. For Brassett and 
Vaughan-Williams, crisis is governance.18 This formulation is meant to underline how 
experiencing the present as ‘crisis’ can reproduce the subject-positions upon which an 
existing set of power relations depend. Here again a discourse of trauma is central to 
their argument. Yet in analysing its production, they place more explicit emphasis on 
the work of narrativisation. The present becomes a moment of trauma, they argue, 
through “a stringing together of multiple occurrences”, and it is only with this work 
that particular diagnoses and responses can ever appear as self-evident.19 Hence, for 
Brassett and his co-authors, trauma narratives can work to constrain the political 
possibilities of a present, and this was clearly the case during the subprime-cum-global 
‘crisis’ of 2008.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Brassett and Clarke, ‘Performing Sub-Prime’. 
17 Ibid., p. 14. See also James Brassett, Lena Rethel and Matthew Watson, ‘The Political 
Economy of the Subprime Crisis: The Economics, Politics and Ethics of Response’, New 
Political Economy, 15:1 (2010), pp. 1-7. 
18 Brassett and Vaughan-Williams, ‘Crisis is Governance’. 
19 Ibid., p. 28. 
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In the present context, what is crucial is that such analyses highlight how the 
experience of a financial event as traumatic hinges on the narration of that event as a 
recurrent form of crisis. They do not suggest that all crisis-histories need be histories of 
traumatic recurrence, yet neither do they provide an indication of how narrativisation 
might otherwise relay financial events as crises.20 In what follows I argue that the 
conjuring of crisis-histories can relay events as traumatic through narratives of 
revelation as well as recurrence. I also suggest that the retroactive structure of 
revelation enables such narratives to furnish new apparent truths about the logics of 
political and economic history. With this comes the possibility for crisis-histories to 
reinvent rather than simply reproduce old modes of managing crises. 
 
Trauma and terror: on the therapeutic function of repeating history  
 
Like memory, the concept of trauma has become increasingly prominent within 
academic historical discourse. Memory and trauma are also closely related, for the rise 
of trauma studies in the humanities and social sciences has taken shape through 
questions about how past events resonate with or find echoes in later presents.21 
‘Trauma’ is thus typically imagined as possessing a non-linear temporality – it names 
a shock or wound that refuses to go away, a rip in the fabric of experiential time. This, 
however, is a formulation that leaves open both the nature of the shock and the ways 
in which it later returns or is repeated. Here I join Susannah Radstone and others in 
stressing the distinctly historical dimensions of trauma.  
For Radstone the traumatic or traumatising event is not simply one that resists 
representation, as paradigmatic studies of the Holocaust have suggested.22 Instead, it 
is an invasive occurrence that disrupts or throws into question prevailing modes of 
representation. These modes of representation can and do include the “interpretive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See Brassett and Clarke, ‘Performing Sub-Prime’, p. 18. 
21 In this context the Holocaust still serves as the paradigmatic case study, but trauma 
thinking has also proved influential in the study of other genocides, as well as plagues, wars, 
famines, terrorist attacks, and even financial crises. For example, see Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed 
Experience: Trauma, Narrative and History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); 
Dominick LaCapra, History and Memory After Auschwitz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); 
Jenny Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics; Maja Zehfuss, Wounds of Memory; and Paul 
Crosthwaite, ‘Is a Financial Crisis a Trauma?’ Cultural Critique, 82: Fall (2012), pp. 34-67. 
22 Susannah Radstone, ‘Trauma Theory: Contexts, Politics, Ethics’, Paragraph, 30:1 (2007), 
pp. 9-29. In contrast, see Saul Friedlander, (ed.), Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and 
the ‘Final Solution’ (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992). 
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schemata” we use to make sense of history (such as narratives of cyclical or linear 
progression).23 Furthermore, as Kate Lawless points out, the traumatic event cannot 
return all on its own, somehow unfolding itself in a way that “corresponds with the 
unfolding of history”.24 Rather, it is we that must return to the past and interpret it as 
somehow affiliated with the present in order for a trauma to be constituted. This is 
how and why White reads Freud’s account of trauma as a window onto the nature of 
historical events such as crises. “There is no such thing as an inherently traumatic 
event”, White maintains, for just as crises must be narrated into existence, so too must 
traumas.25 Trauma, then, “names only a particular response to crisis”, which entails a 
crisis being “apperceived rather than perceived” as the rupture that it will later be 
taken for.26 It is in this apperception that the therapeutics of repeating history resides. 
Returning to the past – with all its potential for imputed echoes and affiliations – is a 
form of modern ritual that holds out the promise to rescue history from itself. Such a 
ritual is integral, I argue, to the diagnosis and treatment of contemporary events as 
traumatic crises. 
In The Myth of the Eternal Return, Eliade provides a detailed analysis of the rites 
and rituals practiced in various archaic religious societies. Throughout, his focus is on 
how the repetition of such rituals provides the people of these societies with a defense 
against what he calls “the terror of history”.27 By terror Eliade means the senseless 
onslaught of suffering and catastrophe, whose arbitrary appearance threatens to make 
life itself intolerable. In the face of this terror, he argues, ‘archaic man’ rejects or takes 
flight from history, finding solace instead in rituals that generate and reaffirm his place 
in the cosmos.28 While such practices might seem a world away from ours, Eliade’s 
idea of ritual repetition in fact provides a useful lens through which to view recent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Antoine Bousquet, ‘Time Zero: Hiroshima, September 11 and Apocalyptic Revelations in 
Historical Consciousness’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 34:3 (2006), pp. 739-64, at 
739. 
24 Kate Lawless, ‘Unrecyclable Times: The Traumatic Topographies of Global Capitalism 
in W.G. Sebald’s Austerlitz’, The Word Hoard, 1:2 (2013): pp. 94-108, at 94. 
25 White, ‘The Historical Event’, p. 29, emphasis in original. 
26 Ibid., p. 30, emphasis added. 
27 Eliade, Eternal Return, p. 149. 
28 Eliade’s terminology is unlikely to sit well with the contemporary reader, but what he 
means to designate with terms like ‘archaic’ are societies without historical discourse. In his 
study these “premodern or ‘traditional’ societies include both the world usually known as 
‘primitive’, and the ancient cultures of Asia, Europe, and America” (in Eternal Return, p. 3). 
Moreover, for Eliade the ontologies of such societies need not give way to historicism. Indeed 
he anticipates the opposite: “as the terror of history grows worse … the positions of 
historicism will increasingly lose in prestige” (ibid., p. 153). 
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appeals to past crises. After and with Eliade, we can understand these appeals as part 
of a response to the terror of modern capitalist history – i.e., the pervasive fear that 
there is neither rhyme nor reason to our terminal economies of blood, shit and 
malaise. But rather than providing an escape from history altogether, this quasi-
historical ritual serves instead to supplement the defenses against history that 
economic and political science has proved able to provide. The ritual is thus a return 
to the historical record, and it is repeated in order to shore up the institution of 
historiography at the very same time as its limits are revealed through the chaos of 
pure occurrence. Here I want to indicate the rites of this return by drawing out its 
continuity with earlier, anti-historical imaginaries. 
According to Eliade, one way that early religious societies dealt with the terror 
of history was through an archetype of recurrence. This mythical figure – which is 
transmitted between generations through various rituals and ceremonies – enables 
ancient civilisations to refuse history and identify instead with the eternal periodicity 
of the cosmos.29 As I will go on to demonstrate, an avowedly modern, quasi-historical 
equivalent of this gesture can be found in the idea of another, ‘new’ Great Depression. 
In this cyclical narrativisation of crisis, the political and economic dynamics of 2008 
appear as a recurrence of those threw the world into turmoil during the 1930s. The 
archetype of recurrence thus serves to give recognisable shape and figure to history. 
But in so doing, history itself is invested with precisely the kind of regularity whose 
absence otherwise makes the cosmos an attractive refuge. Returns to the Great 
Depression thus enable an ongoing ‘crisis’ to affirm an old apparent truth about the 
logics of political and economic history. 
A second archetype that Eliade uncovers, and which I want to stress here, is 
that of revelation. For Eliade this figure enables archaic man to escape the terror of 
history by turning his misfortunes into ‘theophanies’.30  Once the sufferings and 
catastrophes of human existence are treated as divine interventions, they are no longer 
senseless. On one hand, they draw justice from God’s Providence; on the other, they 
reveal more of what to strive for in advance of history’s promised End.31 As I will 
show, a secular equivalent of this gesture can be found in contemporary appeals to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Ibid., pp. 73-92 and 112-30. 
30 Ibid., pp. 102-12. 
31 Speaking of later Hebrew and Christian theodicies, Hayden White terms this the ‘figure-
fulfillment model’ of trauma, thus highlighting the retroactive structure of revelation. See 
White, ‘The Historical Event’, p. 28. 
	   11 
past crises as harbingers of present developments. For example, when the staff of the 
International Monetary Fund revisits the birth of their organisation in the wake of the 
Great Depression, they apperceive that episode as a point of origin for 
transformations now culminating in the renewed multilateralism of the present. 
Similarly, when representatives of the European Central Bank recall the Asian crisis, 
this too becomes a harbinger after-the-fact for the rise of new multilateral fora, such as 
the Group of 20 and the Financial Stability Board. In both cases a form of 
historiophany is at work, wherein the ongoing ‘crisis’ enables the past to produce a new 
apparent truth about the logics of political and economic history. 
The productive power of these archetypes resides in the content of the 
narrative form. As White points out, narrative discourse always has both literal and 
figurative referents, and in the case of historical narrative, the figurative referent is 
history as such.32 Each of these referents here serves as an object of ritual repetition. 
On one hand, the financial instability of 2008 brings with it a literal return of or to the 
Great Depression and the Asian crisis. Yet on the other, portrayals of these episodes 
themselves entail a number of figurative returns, wherein the two crises reappear as 
either coming recurrence or forgotten intimation. In each instance, the past is made to reveal 
both the process of history and the present it has produced. Moreover, as I outline in 
the next section, it is precisely this process that then enables practical lessons to be 
drawn regarding how such a present might be governed, negotiated, or managed. 
Thus, while appearing to draw lessons from a self-evident history of political and 
economic change, the managers of global finance must in fact first conjure this 
history. In what follows I show in detail how the archetypes of recurrence and 
revelation have been mobilised in ways that work both to sustain and reinvent 
contemporary modes of crisis management.  
 
Histories of crisis management, 2007-2009 
 
In order to do this I closely examine the public discourse on financial crisis between 
2007 and 2009. Rather than examining a wide range of different sources, I proceed 
instead by systematically analysing the public pronouncements made by a small group 
of policymaking organisations. More concretely, I focus on speeches and press 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 White, Content of the Form, pp. 169-84. 
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statements delivered by representatives from four different organisations: the 
European Central Bank (ECB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United 
States Federal Reserve Bank (US FRB), and the United States Treasury (US 
Treasury). This combination of governmental ministries, independent technocratic 
bodies, and international organisations is intended to provide a way into the “tangle of 
local spaces and times” through which global finance is governed.33 Moreover, by 
virtue of their direct involvement in recent crisis management efforts, these 
organisations also provide a way into the practical intertwinement of such efforts with 
a recollection of past crises during the specific period in question.  
 
Organisation      Type of representative/number of statements or speeches ∑ 
ECB      President/Vice-Presidents: 86 speeches; Board Members: 78 speeches 164 
IMF      Management: 94 speeches 94 
US FRB      Board of Governors: 138 speeches 138 
US Treasury      Officials: 75 speeches; 66 statements 141 
 
 
Table 1  Overview of corpus for crisis discourse  (Source: Author’s own) 
* This corpus consists of public statements or speeches that meet two criteria: 
(1) they address ongoing financial or economic turmoil; and (2) they are 
delivered between January 2007 and December 2009. 
  
The corpus as a whole consists of 537 texts. In analysing this material I employ 
the NVivo software package as a coding and sorting device. It is used differently at each 
stage in a three-step procedure. First, a preliminary reading of all texts is undertaken, 
enabling past crises to be manually coded no matter how those episodes appear in the 
text. The economic instability of the interwar years, for example, can appear as the 
‘Great Crash’, ‘1929’, the ‘Great Depression’, the ‘1930s’, and so on. These codes 
then form the basis for a second round of reading, which focuses on those past crises 
that are revealed to be the most frequently invoked. Through this reading the first set 
of codes is supplemented with a second, which are used to sort references into 
emergent thematic categories. A reference to the ‘Great Depression’, for example, can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Hanjo Berressem, ‘Crystal History: “You Pick Up the Pieces. You Connect the Dots”’, in 
Bernd Herzogenrath (ed.), Time and History in Deleuze and Serres (London: Continuum, 2012), 
pp. 203-228, at 215. 
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concern monetary policy, financial regulation, international trade, and so on. Finally, 
a third round of chronological reading organised through these code-sets is used to 
explore the ways in which different past crises figure within narratives concerning 
specific aspects of the ongoing ‘crisis’. The abridged results of the preliminary reading 
and coding exercise are presented in the table below. 
 
 ECB IMF US FRB 
US 
TREASURY ∑ 
1930s Great Depression 26 25 16 13 80 
1997-98 Asian crisis 29 20 11 7 67 
1990s Japanese crisis 11 6 8 7 32 
1970s OECD crises 19 2 2 -- 23 
2001 Dotcom crash 16 1 13 1 31 
 
 
Table 2    Overview of references to past crises    (Source: Author’s own) 
* This table records the number of different texts in which the specified past 
crises are invoked. For example, between 2007 and 2009 the ECB refers to 
the Great Depression on a total of 26 separate occasions. 
 
As the table indicates, the two most frequently invoked past crises are the 
Great Depression of the 1930s and the Asian crisis of 1997-98. In the next section I 
focus on how these two episodes figure within discussions that relate to the conduct of 
crisis management and global governance. I show that while the Great Depression 
does figure within narratives of traumatic recurrence, both it and the Asian crisis are 
also incorporated into stories about the emergence and evolution of multilateralism. 
Rather than simply reiterating the need for familiar modes of crisis management, 
these ‘revelatory’ narratives enable global elites to find new clues and lessons in prior 
episodes of financial crisis. In so doing, I argue, they themselves reveal an 
unacknowledged role for the past in the governance of global finance.  
 
The ‘Great Depression’ and the birth of multilateralism 
 
The 1930s are typically construed as a moment of crisis for the world economy. 
Whether it is the expiration of British hegemony and the undoing of laissez-faire, or 
the rise of Keynesianism and the emergence of a new ‘embedded liberalism’, most 
historians identify some kind of transformation that has had lasting structural 
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impact.34 Between 2007 and 2009, these and other histories of the Great Depression 
reappear in the public pronouncements of all four policymaking organisations. At first 
references to the 1930s are only intermittent, but in late 2008 they become more 
frequent, reaching a peak in mid-2009. The IMF and the ECB account for just over 
half of these, while the remainder is spread more or less evenly between the US FRB 
and the US Treasury. The return of or to the Great Depression is therefore a 
widespread phenomenon, and this is especially so after the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September of 2008. 
 
 
 
Figure 1     References to the Great Depression     (Source: Author’s own) 
* The Great Depression appears in a total of 80 speeches or statements. Of 
these the ECB accounts for 26, the IMF for 25, the US FRB for 16, and the 
US Treasury for 13. 
 
Among these various references to the Great Depression, a significant 
proportion take the form of analogies with the scope and scale of disruption wrought 
by that prior episode. These begin to appear in mid-2008, and are initially posed in 
tentative terms. For example, in June of 2008 the IMF characterises the preceding 
months as “one of the most trying times for financial markets in several decades, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 For example, compare Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (London: 
Allen Lane, 1973); Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our 
Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001/1944); Marc Trachtenberg, ‘Keynes Triumphant: A Study 
in the Social History of Economic Ideas’, Knowledge and Society, 4 (1983), pp. 17-86; and John 
Gerard Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in 
the Postwar Economic Order’, International Organization, 36:2 (1982), pp. 379-415. 
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perhaps since the 1930’s Great Depression”.35 A month later the US FRB describes 
the events of the past year as “one of the worst financial shocks that the United States 
has confronted since the Great Depression”.36 But once financial market dynamics 
begin to affect growth rates, the qualifying clauses are gone and officials from all four 
organisations are opening their speeches by alluding to “the most severe and 
synchronised economic downturn since the 1930s”.37 While these analogies of scope 
and scale might seem to serve as a mere preface to technical policy discussion, they do 
more than work to convey the magnitude of the challenge facing policymakers. By 
forming the basis for more or less implicit narratives of recurrence, such analogies 
deliver a radically uncertain present over to history; and in so doing they serve to 
frame and shape each organisation’s pronouncements on crisis prevention, crisis 
management, and crisis resolution.  
The narrative function of these analogies and the lessons they support is 
evident in a range of different policy areas, but here I focus on how the 1930s figure 
within discussions of international cooperation. The earliest representations of this 
sort appear in July of 2007, when the IMF cautions against a repeat of the “narrow 
nationalism that characterized the Depression era”.38 Some seven months later the 
US Treasury also invokes the “insular policies of the 1930s”, describing these as “ill-
fated efforts to gain an edge in world trade”.39 Given their timing, such warnings 
probably speak more to the stalled trade negotiations of the Doha Round than 
financial or economic instability per se. But by mid-2008, lessons of this sort are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Saleh Nsouli, ‘Lessons from the Recent Financial Crisis and the Role of the Fund’, Paris 
(26 June 2008), Section I. Available at: 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2008/062608.htm>. Accessed 22 June 2009. 
36 Frederic Mishkin, ‘Global Financial Turmoil and the World Economy’, Eliat (2 July 
2008), Section I. Available at: 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/mishkin20080702a.htm>. Accessed 29 
July 2009. 
37 Jürgen Stark, ‘EMU: Weathering the Perfect Storm’, London (25 June 2009), Section I. 
Available at: <http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2009/html/sp090625.en.html>. 
Accessed 30 June 2009. See also Michael Barr, ‘Remarks on Regulatory Reform’, 
Washington DC (15 July 2009), Section I. Available at: <http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/tg213.aspx>. Accessed 18 September 2013. 
38 Rodrigo de Rato, ‘Confronting the Future with Wisdom and Courage’, Washington DC 
(19 July 2007), Point 7. Available at: 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2007/071907.htm>. Accessed 28 May 2009. 
39 David McCormick, ‘Remarks at the Peter G. Peterson Institute for International 
Economics Conference on IMF Reform’, Washington DC (25 February 2008), Section II. 
Available at: <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp838.aspx>. 
Accessed 18 September 2013. 
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drawn in explicit relation to destabilising financial market dynamics. The first to do 
this is the ECB, which uses the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 to illustrate the self-
defeating effects of a protectionist response to financial crises. According to its then 
Executive Board Member Lorenzo Smaghi: “Experience shows that such measures 
damage economic growth and tend to worsen crises”, meaning that to even think 
about “curbing international trade would be a mistake in the same way as in 1929”.40 
In late 2008 the IMF makes or more less the same move when it argues that 
“an upsurge of nationalism” was not just “one of the worst consequences of the Great 
Depression”, but also “one of its causes”.41 Here again US tariff policy serves as a case 
in point. The US Treasury and the ECB soon follow suit,42 focusing on the role of 
exchange rate policy and trade protectionism more generally, and by mid-2009 
appeals of this sort are commonplace. Crucially, though, while various dimensions of 
economic nationalism are highlighted, in each instance the Great Depression is put to 
work in the service of free-trade principles. This is in keeping with classic narrative 
accounts of the 1930s, where a slide into protectionism and a subsequent drying-up of 
world trade are cast as the primary drivers of economic collapse.43 But here that 
narrative is transposed into the present as a narrated threat of recurrence, and 
because this threat brings with it the specter of unemployment, fascism, and war, the 
idea of the Depression works to ensure a liberal response to ongoing financial and 
economic uncertainties.44 This is precisely the kind of disciplining effect that Brassett 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Lorenzo Smaghi, ‘From Tuscany’s 19th Century Currency, the Fiorino, to the Euro’, 
Florence (15 May 2008), Paragraphs 28-29. Available at: 
<http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2008/html/sp080515_2.en.html>. Accessed 27 
October 2009. 
41 Dominique Strauss-Kahn, ‘Remarks to the Board of Governors of the IMF’, Washington 
DC (13 October 2008), Paragraph 12. Available at: 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2008/101308.htm>. Accessed 22 June 2009. 
42 Mark Sobel, ‘Remarks on the Global Financial Crisis and the IMF’s Response’ (2 
December 2008), Section I. Available at: <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/hp1307.aspx>. Accessed 18 September 2013. Lorenzo Smaghi, ‘The 
Financial Crisis and Global Imbalances’, Beijing (9 December 2008), Section II. Available at: 
<http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2008/html/sp081209.en.html>. Accessed 5 October 
2009. 
43 This, for example, is the narrative that underpins Kindleberger’s The World in Depression. 
Incidentally, Kindleberger’s narrative of the Great Depression was carried through into 
subsequent theories of hegemonic stability within international studies. On these theories and 
the debates they inspired see Isabelle Grunberg, ‘Exploring the “Myth” of Hegemonic 
Stability’, International Organization, 44:4 (1990), pp. 431-77. 
44 I discuss these and other narrated threats of recurrence at length in Amin Samman, ‘The 
1930s as Black Mirror: Visions of Historical Repetition in the Global Financial Press, 2007-
2009’, Journal of Cultural Economy, 5:2 (2012), pp. 213-29. For a similar analysis that focuses 
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and his co-authors foreground in their analysis of trauma narratives and the 
performance of crisis as governance. 
Elsewhere though it is possible to observe other forms of historical imagination 
at work. At the same time as they speak of direct barriers to trade, both the ECB and 
the US Treasury also focus on the role of competitive currency devaluations during 
the 1930s.45 These too are linked to conventional lessons about the errors of economic 
nationalism, but beyond this, they also feed into a different set of narratives and 
lessons about international cooperation and policy coordination. In December of 
2008, for example, both the IMF and ECB interpret recent financial sector 
developments through the lens of the 1930s. For its part, the IMF depicts the rush to 
provide deposit guarantees for financial institutions as a 1930s-style ‘beggar-thy-
neighbor’ policy,46 while the ECB instead stresses “a lack of trust within and between 
financial systems”, and the damaging effect this is having on trade finance.47 But what 
both end up doing is engineering a kind of short-circuit between the trade 
protectionism of the past and the financial protectionism of the present. If the former 
did not work, then why should the latter?  
In one respect, this short-circuit reinforces and supplements the disciplining 
effects performed by narratives of traumatic recurrence. The image of the Great 
Depression as a recurrent or recurring form of crisis remains fundamentally 
unchallenged, and because its lessons for trade policy are transposed into the domain 
of finance, this same image now enables fundamentally novel developments – such as 
the uneven provision of deposit guarantees – to be apprehended through a pre-
existing paradigm for crisis management. It is through this process that old lessons 
find new applications. But at the same time, this short-circuiting is also implicated in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
specifically on trade discourse and policy, see Gabriel Siles-Brügge, ‘Explaining the Resilience 
of Free Trade: The “Smoot-Hawley” Myth and the Crisis’, Review of International Political 
Economy, 21:3 (2014), pp. 535-74. 
45 Lorenzo Smaghi, ‘The Euro Area's Exchange Rate Policy and the Experience with 
International Monetary Coordination during the Crisis’, Brussels (6 April 2009), Section I. 
Available at: <http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2009/html/sp090406.en.html>. 
Accessed 19 October 2009. Timothy Geithner, ‘The United States and China: Cooperating 
for Recovery and Growth’, Beijing (1 June 2009), Section II. Available at: 
<http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg152.aspx>. Accessed 18 
September 2013. 
46 John Lipsky, ‘Crisis Lessons For The IMF’, New York (17 December 2008), Section IV. 
Available at: <http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2008/121708.htm>. Accessed 28 
May 2009. 
47 Smaghi, ‘Financial Crisis and Global Imbalances’, Section II 
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another quite different process. Specifically, by enabling new emergency measures to 
be recruited as symptoms of a step-change in policy collaboration, it also works to 
augment and transform the very idea of multilateralism as a mode of governing global 
finance. Rather than simply a question of tariffs and exchange rates, collaboration 
now becomes more explicitly linked to the domains of monetary, fiscal and even 
financial sector policy; and rather than simply a task for the established clubs and 
Bretton Woods institutions, the coordination of these measures is now also entrusted 
to new fora such as the Group of 20 (G20). There are two key steps in this process. 
The first involves incorporating novel policy responses into a counter-analogy 
with those enacted during the 1930s. This process begins in October of 2008, when 
the then IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn addresses the Board of 
Governors at the Annual Joint Meeting of the World Bank and the IMF. In his speech 
Strauss-Kahn reiterates the need to keep nationalist reflexes at bay, but here the 
“mistakes of the past” – and in particular, those of the 1930s – are contrasted with the 
sheer range of unorthodox measures being enacted by central banks and finance 
ministries in the Western world.48 Yet in order for such measures to be truly effective, 
he argues, “action should be coordinated, at the global level, and at the regional level 
where appropriate”.49 Strauss-Kahn and his colleagues at the IMF repeat this demand 
on a number of occasions over the following months,50 and as crisis response efforts 
continue to evolve, more and more of their references to the 1930s contrast that 
period with the comprehensive cooperation of the present. Coordinated interest-rate 
cuts, central bank liquidity swaps, and simultaneous fiscal stimulus packages – all of 
which are unprecedented, we are reminded – are in this way taken to signify a 
important change in the form and content of international cooperation. 
The second key step involves using these new cooperative measures to rewrite 
the story of multilateralism. The US Treasury is first to revisit this story, but its 
accounts remain more or less in keeping with pre-crisis orthodoxy – that is, while its 
narratives consistently portray the Great Depression as a motivating force behind the 
creation of the Bretton Woods system, these hinge only on lessons-learned regarding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Strauss-Kahn, ‘Remarks to the Board of Governors’, Paragraphs 3, 7, and 10. 
49 Ibid., Paragraph 19. 
50 Lipsky, ‘Crisis Lessons for the IMF’, Section IV. See also Dominique Strauss-Kahn, 
‘Speech delivered at the 44th SEACEN Governors’ Conference’, Kuala Lumpur (7 February 
2009), Section I. Available at: 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2009/020709.htm>. Accessed 22 June 2009. 
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tariff wars and competitive devaluations.51 By mid-2009, however, ‘green-shoots’ of 
recovery prompt a search for the origins of what is increasingly seen to be a novel and 
effective paradigm for crisis management. Here it is the IMF that takes the lead, 
finding new clues about the present in its own organisational history: 
 
One of the key lessons of the Great Depression was that a lack of cooperation 
and a retreat to isolationism can make things dramatically worse … The IMF 
was born in Bretton Woods, forged in the furnace of this multilateral idealism, 
and endowed with a mandate to oversee the global financial system and to act 
as a lender of last resort to members with balance of payments needs … Over 
sixty years later, although the contours of the world financial system would be 
unrecognizable to the Bretton Woods delegates, the IMF remains as central as 
ever. But it took the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression for this to be made 
manifest.52 
 
In the above passage, Strauss-Kahn returns to the Bretton Woods conference 
and the creation of the IMF, presenting the latter as a direct response to the mistakes 
of the 1930s. But rather than faithfully reproducing this familiar narrative, Strauss-
Kahn instead re-reads the 1930s as the moment in which the IMF’s present-day 
purpose first emerged. Although the world of finance has been transformed beyond 
recognition, its need for the IMF has been ‘made manifest’ through an echo between 
then and now. The Great Depression and the present therefore reveal something new 
not simply about each other, but also about the place of the IMF within the 
governance of global finance. 
This self-celebrating narrative is repeated on numerous occasions, and it is 
typically accompanied by an emphasis on the unprecedented degree of policy 
collaboration that has been undertaken in the face of crisis. But beyond this, the IMF 
also goes on to link this process to the rise of the G20, which it now depicts as central 
to the success of global governance going forward: 
 
In the face of crisis, countries came together to face common challenges with 
common solutions, focusing on the global common good … This 
collaboration encompassed more countries than ever before in history – 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 See McCormick, ‘Remarks on IMF Reform’, Section II; and Sobel, ‘Global Financial 
Crisis and the IMF’, Section I. 
52 Dominique Strauss-Kahn, ‘Multilateralism and the Role of the International Monetary 
Fund in the Global Financial Crisis’, Washington DC (23 April 2009), Section I, emphasis 
added. Available at: <http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2009/042309.htm>. 
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showing us that in our modern globalized world, responsibility for the 
economic policy agenda can no longer rest with a small club of countries. The 
crisis heralded the ascent of the G20 – a group that includes the dynamic 
emerging economies – as the leading vehicle of multilateral cooperation.53 
 
Here Strauss-Kahn once again conjures the spirit of multilateralism. But 
where before it was to the birth of this spirit that he spoke, here he focuses instead on 
the ‘ascent of the G20’, which now appears as its latest and most comprehensive 
manifestation. Taken together, these two moves produce a kind of crisis-history that 
does not conform to the figure of recurrence. Neither the Great Depression nor the 
global downturn that began in 2008 make sense without the other, yet the relatedness 
of these events does not emerge through their apparent similarities alone. Instead, an 
echo between these two ‘crises’ enables the 1930s to appear as the birth of the 
multilateral spirit, and recent efforts at crisis management as nothing less than the 
ongoing evolution of that spirit. An extended version of this revelation narrative can 
be found in discussions of the Asian crisis. 
 
The ‘Asian crisis’ and the transformation of multilateralism 
 
The Asian crisis is usually identified as the first truly global financial crisis of the post-
Cold War world. At the time of its outbreak, scholars tended to interpret it in one of 
two ways. In the first, it was an expression of the dangers that global capital flows 
could pose to developing nations, suggesting a need to rethink the rush towards 
financial integration.54 In the second, it was taken instead as a sign that the developing 
world needed to be made safe for capital flows.55 Both of these interpretations went on 
to shape policy debate in the years that followed, prompting broader arguments about 
the end of the ‘Washington consensus’ and cementing Asia’s place at the heart of a 
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story called neoliberalism.56 But as Laura Kang has recently shown, the Asian crisis 
acquires a host of new meanings during the financial turmoil of 2008.57 In the public 
pronouncements of the four organisations under study here, these new meanings 
emerge through a steady stream of references to the Asian crisis. 
 
 
 
Figure 2          References to the Asian crisis         (Source: Author’s own) 
* The Asian crisis is appears in a total of 67 speeches or statements. Of these 
ECB accounts for 29, the IMF for 20, the US FRB for 11, and the US 
Treasury for 7. 
 
While these references are made with some frequency by all four 
organisations, there is no immediately obvious pattern in their timing. One might 
point to a concentration in late 2007 (which coincides with a ten-year anniversary), as 
well as to something of a cluster in the second half of 2008, but on the whole the 
return of the Asian crisis is a less acute phenomenon than the return of the Great 
Depression. The Asian crisis also exhibits a more radical polyvalence over the three 
years in question. The US FRB, for example, uses it in March of 2007 in order to 
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illustrate how uncertainty can reduce market liquidity; 58 and then later on in that 
year, both the FRB and the IMF invoke it as an example of how banking sector crises 
can adversely affect real economic activity.59 These kinds of passing analogies and 
lessons are supplemented by other more substantive re-narrativisations. For example, 
where initial discussions of the Asian crisis still focus on the interaction between 
domestic institutions and international capital flows, the US FRB pioneers an ‘over-
saving’ narrative that is gradually taken up by all other three organisations. In this 
new narrative, the Asian crisis figures as a point of origin for global payments 
imbalances, which in turn are linked to the ongoing financial instability.60 This is a 
significant transformation in that it overturns and reappraises the apparent 
‘demolition’ of the Asian developmental state.61 Here however I again focus on the 
place of the Asian crisis within discussions about international cooperation. 
The earliest such use of the Asian crisis appears in January of 2007, when the 
IMF invokes that episode in order to illustrate the need for an international lender of 
last resort.62 Given its timing, this intervention might have more to do with allegations 
about the Fund’s waning relevance than any debate about the immediate need for 
emergency financing.63 The same could also be said of the US FRB’s intervention in 
late 2007, which uses the South Korean rescue package of 1998 to illustrate the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Kevin Warsh, ‘Market Liquidity: Definitions and Implications’, Washington DC (5 March 
2007), Section II. Available at: 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/warsh20070305a.htm>. Accessed 6 
October 2009. 
59 David Burton, ‘Asia: Ten Years On’, Singapore (5 June 2007), Section I. Available at: 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2007/060507.htm>. Accessed 28 May 2009. 
Randall Kroszner, ‘Analyzing and Assessing Banking Crises’, San Francisco (6 September 
2007), Section II. Available at: 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kroszner20070906a.htm>. Accessed 6 
October 2009. 
60 The then Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke first articulates this crisis 
history in a speech entitled ‘Global Imbalances: Recent Developments and Prospects’, Berlin 
(11 September 2007). Available at: 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070911a.htm>. Accessed 6 
October 2009. 
61 On the global narration of state failure in South Korea after its crisis, see Rodney Bruce 
Hall, ‘The Discursive Demolition of the Asian Development Model’, International Studies 
Quarterly, 47:1 (2003), pp. 71-99. 
62 Rodrigo de Rato, ‘Ten Years After the Asian Currency Crisis’, Tokyo (22 January 2007a), 
Point I. Available at: <http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2007/012207.htm>. 
Accessed 28 May 2009. 
63 In late 2007 the IMF faced considerable budgetary pressures, prompting it to layoff 15% 
of its staff in order to reduce operating expenses. See André Broome, ‘The International 
Monetary Fund, Crisis Management and the Credit Crunch’, Australian Journal of International 
Affairs, 64:1 (2010), pp. 37-54, at 45-6. 
	   23 
Fund’s relative expertise in providing and/or facilitating such financing.64 By mid-
2008, however, the Asian crisis is regularly incorporated into broader discussions 
about policy cooperation and structural reform at the international level.  
The organisation at the forefront of this process is the ECB, which begins in 
late 2007 to craft a narrative about the evolution of international economic 
cooperation. The Asian crisis functions within this in two distinct but complementary 
ways. In the first, it is used – along with the crisis of the 1970s – in order to develop a 
general lesson about the relation between globalisation, crisis, and international 
reform: 
 
It is obvious that the systemic changes we are observing in the world’s 
economic and financial system require systematic changes in the policy 
framework. The rules of the game need to adapt in order to keep pace with 
developments. This recognition is not new. It was felt already in the 1970s 
with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. And it was felt very 
strongly in the aftermath of the Asian crisis ten years ago.65 
 
In the above passage, the then ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet alludes to a 
sequence of three crises, and through this he offers an implicit rendering of the logic 
behind political and economic history. Globalisation drives structural change, 
structural change creates new forms of global crisis, and new forms of global crisis 
reveal gaps in existing systems of governance. Global stability, in turn, hinges on the 
adaptability of international institutions, and crisis prevention – to the extent that such 
a thing is even possible – becomes “a constant task that requires continuous scrutiny 
and effort” on the part of the international community.66 Crisis and international 
reform are in this way presented as two different sides of the same globalisation 
process. 
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The second key function performed by the Asian crisis is to retroactively mark 
a watershed in the globalisation of governance. As an expression of the possibility for 
crisis, the events of 1997-98 are far from unique. Trichet is explicit about this: “It is 
clear, this [Asian] crisis was not the first one … And it certainly was not the last 
one”.67 But as an expression of the possibility for governance, 1997-98 is for Trichet a 
singular and decisive turning point: “[I]t was the Asian crisis”, he reminds us, “that 
revealed a number of vulnerabilities in national and international financial systems”, 
and “that led to an enormous reform agenda at the international level”.68 Of course, it 
is well known that 1997-98 prompted numerous calls for a ‘new international financial 
architecture’, but these calls are also widely seen to have produced little in the way of 
concrete reform.69 Trichet’s move is therefore a kind of rediscovery or revelation, 
whereby post-1997 reforms are apperceived as a foretelling of those that emerge 
through the crisis of 2008. This re-narrativisation yields two distinct visions for the 
future of financial governance and its modes of managing crises. 
The first of these concerns the issue of financial sector policy coordination. 
When looking back on the legacy of the Asian crisis, different organisations 
consistently emphasise the creation of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) in 1999. 
Yet the way in which they do this changes over time. Initially, the ECB focuses on the 
Forum’s promotion of standards and codes.70 In so doing, it draws an implicit link 
between the Asian crisis and the idea of voluntary micro-prudential reform. But then 
in mid-2008, after the FSF presents its Report on the ongoing financial turmoil, the 
ECB instead focuses on the membership and mandate of the Forum, pointing out that 
it was created in order to enable “a synthetic diagnosis of the state of global 
finance”.71 Here the Asian crisis is linked to a new form of coordination under the FSF 	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rather than the substantive content of its early initiatives. At around the same time, the 
US Treasury makes similar remarks,72 and by late 2008, the FSF is identified by both 
organisations as being at the heart of ongoing efforts to understand the multilevel 
interface between micro and macro-prudential risk.73 These efforts constitute a clear 
departure from the approach to financial regulation that the FSF pioneered in the 
aftermath of the Asian crisis, and yet they are nevertheless apperceived as a 
continuation of that earlier reform agenda. 
In this way, the Asian crisis is effectively retrofitted with new historical 
meaning and significance. Its pre-existing legacy is not effaced in response to the 
‘crisis’ of 2008, but is instead rewritten to incorporate subsequent shifts in the 
international agenda for regulatory reform. Indeed, after the FSF becomes the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) and assumes a more central role within the global 
regulatory system, the US FRB even draws a link between this new body and the 
Asian crisis by explicitly portraying the latter as a precursor to the former.74 Rather 
than simply marking the emergence of a global agenda for domestic reform, the Asian 
crisis is now also seen to underpin the creation of an institution capable of one day 
envisioning a much more extensive kind of international supervisory cooperation. 
A similar process can be observed in relation to multilateralism more 
generally. In late 2007, the ECB begins to portray the Asian crisis as part of a shift 
towards more inclusive forms of global governance. Initially this involves focusing on 
the creation of the G20 in 1999, which it suggests was motivated by a post-1997 
revelation about the importance of emerging markets.75 But as the G20 becomes a 
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more central forum for discussing crisis-response measures in 2009, the ECB makes a 
second move, reading this new development back into the very inception of the G20: 
 
While the G7 still have an important role to play, the financial crisis has 
confirmed the need to reinforce global governance at the level of a more 
inclusive international informal entity … the creation of the G20 after the 
Asian crisis … was an important step to involve the emerging economies 
more closely in the process of global economic governance. And I am 
therefore, in the present very demanding circumstances, in full accord with 
this strengthened role of the G20. The aspect that impresses me most about 
this emerging global forum is the virtually universal consensus on global 
economic issues that has been reached.76 
 
Once again, this move does not fundamentally alter the overarching structure of the 
ECB’s cooperation narrative. Instead, what we see is the same basic narrative being 
extended forward in order to encompass the ongoing rise of the G20. But by depicting 
this development as an outgrowth of the post-1997 reform agenda, the Asian crisis is 
effectively recast as its harbinger: the unprecedented degree of policy coordination, 
the sustained dialogue on financial sector reform, even the attempts to address current 
account imbalances – all are taken to be signs of a new multilateralism, and all are 
traced back to 1997-98, for in revealing the scope of global interdependence then, it 
was the Asian crisis which gave the world economy the institution it would need to 
undertake these initiatives in 2008-2009. 
It is difficult to say whether or not these re-narrativisations made a decisive 
contribution the renewed or increased prominence of either the FSF/FSB or the G20. 
On one hand, they are chronologically posterior to some of the changes they seek to 
sequence and configure, such as the creation of the FSB in April of 2009. But on the 
other, they are also undertaken at the very same time as the future functions of these 
two fora are being debated and decided. Disentangling this kind of quasi-causality 
would require a different research design to the one presently employed. What we can 
and should say, however, is that the Asian crisis is apperceived as a key moment in the 
globalisation of governance, and that this bears a close resemblance to how the Great 
Depression was tied to the reinvention of the IMF and the rise of the G20. There it 
was the IMF that took the lead, tracing both of these changes back to the birth of the 	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multilateral spirit itself. Here it is the ECB, which instead presents the Asian crisis as a 
turning point within the broader process described by the IMF. In both cases what we 
see is a process whereby past crises are used to understand and justify new sites and 
modes of governing global finance. 
 
Eternally returning to crisis 
 
By way of conclusion I too would like to return to the Asian crisis. In its dying days, 
Paul Krugman published a book called The Return of Depression Economics. 77  His 
argument was that the financial crises of the 1990s were a replay of those that marked 
the 1930s, and that this in turn warranted a reprise of the policies that Keynes 
developed in response to the Great Depression. Some ten years later, Krugman would 
publish a revised and expanded edition of his book with new material on what he 
called ‘The Great Recession’.78 Here he again folds the latest crisis into a familiar 
story about what happens when technocrats and policymakers forget to remember the 
1930s. But neither Krugman nor those elites of which he writes have seemed able to 
help themselves from recalling either the Great Depression or other more recent crises 
of global finance. Why? What work do they do in their seemingly endless returns to 
the historical record? 
Here I have argued that such returns are a form of modern, quasi-historical 
ritual through which contemporary events are diagnosed and treated as particular 
forms of crisis. In so doing I build on and extend recent research into the role of 
traumatic imagery and narrative during times of crisis.79 By drawing our attention to 
how financial events are relayed as both recurrent and traumatic, this research does 
the important critical work of denaturalising those modes of crisis management that 
trauma discourse may reinforce. However, narrativisation need not render all ‘crisis’ 
events as traumas through the archetype of recurrence. This in turn means that crisis-
histories might govern crises in heretofore-unacknowledged ways. Here I have 
highlighted how crisis-histories can also produce ‘historiophanies’, wherein past crises 
are apperceived in ways that furnish new apparent truths about political and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Paul Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics (New York: WW Norton, 1999). 
78 Paul Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008 (New York: WW 
Norton, 2009). 
79 Brassett and Clarke, ‘Performing Sub-Prime’; Brassett and Vaughan-Williams, ‘Crisis is 
Governance’. 
	   28 
economic history. In such instances the past effectively becomes a means of 
reinventing rather than simply reproducing existing ways of governing crisis/history. 
This argument entails three distinct theoretical contributions to the new critical 
literature on trauma and crisis in international studies. 
The first of these is to foreground the work of historical representation. While 
the new literature on crisis as trauma alludes to the importance of narrativity, it 
glosses over both the practice of narrativisation and its relation to historical discourse 
more broadly. By drawing on historical theory, I emphasise how crisis-histories are 
always dependent on a narrative operation, and how this operation entails returning 
to a repertoire of events already produced through historical discourse. The second 
contribution is to identify two different ways in which past events can be incorporated 
into new crisis-histories. When trauma discourse is charged with reinforcing an 
existing mode of crisis management, this is typically linked to visions of historical 
recurrence – narrative projections that announce history as either already or on-the-
cusp of repeating itself. Here I have shown how crisis-histories can also take the form 
of revelation narratives, which work by retroactively investing past crises with entirely 
new meanings. In theory trauma narratives can take this form too, and when they do, 
their productive function within the present need no longer be limited to reinforcing 
existing modes of crisis management. Finally, the third contribution is to highlight 
how these ways of returning to the historical record and repeating its inventory of 
crises can be understood as a ritual through which ‘crisis’ and ‘history’ are both 
conjured and governed.  
Taken together, these points have important implications for how we engage 
the contemporary discourse of financial crisis. In analytical terms, crisis management 
now appears as a kind of magic trick. This is because the very intelligibility of a crisis 
episode, let alone its susceptibility to practical techniques of intervention and 
management, depends on a contingent and self-referential conjuring of history. The 
managers of global finance quite simply stand up and recount to each other the names 
and dates of history until their world makes sense, and it is upon this sense that their 
concrete responses to ‘crisis’ are built. No one is supposed to see the trick behind the 
magic, but once we do the normative question becomes whether to abandon the 
discourse of crisis altogether. In my view this would be a mistake. The crisis event may 
well be a “metaphysical fiction”, but abandoning the worlds of fiction will do nothing 
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to strip them of their magic.80 History too has a metaphysics that cannot be divorced 
from fiction, and ‘crisis’ remains deeply inscribed within the historical imagination of 
our times. 
The task of critique must therefore be to somehow navigate this knotting-up of 
crisis, history, and fiction. The potential pitfalls are clear – as Janet Roitman points 
out, to talk and think with ‘crisis’ is to risk reproducing a host of “existing dichotomies 
and extant hierarchies: public-private, economy-society, morality-politics, material-
ideal, and so forth”.81 Yet to do away with ‘crisis’ is to forgo what is still one of the 
most powerful ways in which conjured histories might be contested. Thus, rather than 
rejecting the magic it entails, I maintain that the discourse of crisis should be 
strategically embraced and deployed by anyone who refuses to wish away the terror of 
capitalist history; by anyone who resents our self-appointed crisis managers for 
subsuming it over and over again beneath triumphant narratives of multilateral 
progress. But if the trick that crisis managers employ is to conjure history while 
appearing to do nothing of the sort, then that of critique must be the opposite – 
namely, to cultivate an appearance of truth and objectivity, while knowing all the 
while that these are nothing more than the bootstraps on which we choose to tug. 
After all, the crises of the past might always one day serve to constitute another 
present and help drag us into a different, better future. 
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